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Abstract 
Background: The increase in opioid overdose deaths has become a national public health crisis. Naloxone is an 
important tool in opioid overdose prevention. Distribution of nasal naloxone has been found to be a feasible, and 
effective intervention in community settings and may have potential high applicability in the emergency depart‑
ment, which is often the initial point of care for persons at high risk of overdose. One safety net hospital introduced 
an innovative policy to offer take‑home nasal naloxone via a standing order to ensure distribution to patients at risk 
for overdose. The aims of this study were to examine acceptance and uptake of the policy and assess facilitators and 
barriers to implementation.
Methods: After obtaining pre‑post data on naloxone distribution, we conducted a qualitative study. The PARiHS 
framework steered development of the qualitative guide. We used theoretical sampling in order to include the range 
of types of emergency department staff (50 total). The constant comparative method was initially used to code the 
transcripts and identify themes; the themes that emerged from the coding were then mapped back to the evidence, 
context and facilitation constructs of the PARiHS framework.
Results: Acceptance of the policy was good but uptake was low. Primary themes related to facilitators included: real‑
world driven intervention with philosophical, clinician and leadership support; basic education and training efforts; 
availability of resources; and ability to leave the ED with the naloxone kit in hand. Barriers fell into five general catego‑
ries: protocol and policy; workflow and logistical; patient‑related; staff roles and responsibilities; and education and 
training.
Conclusions: The actual implementation of a new innovation in healthcare delivery is largely driven by factors 
beyond acceptance. Despite support and resources, implementation was challenging, with low uptake. While the 
potential of this innovation is unknown, understanding the experience is important to improve uptake in this setting 
and offer possible solutions for other facilities to address the opioid overdose crisis. Use of the PARiHS framework 
allowed us to recognize and understand key evidence, contextual and facilitation barriers to the successful implemen‑
tation of the policy and to identify areas for improvement.
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Background
The increase in opioid overdose deaths in the United 
States has led to recognition of opioid overdose as a 
major public policy and public health issue. Opioid use in 
the US is at unprecedented levels and opioid overdose is 
epidemic. Rates of death from drug overdoses have more 
than doubled in the past 20 years [1], surpassing motor 
vehicle crashes as the leading cause of accidental death 
among persons aged 25–64, with 43,982 deaths in 2013 
[2–4]. Opioids are the most common drugs involved in 
overdose deaths, and include both deaths from opioid 
analgesics and from heroin.
Massachusetts has seen a sharp increase in opioid over-
doses and opioid overdose fatalities in recent years. In 
2014, the state experienced a record number of deaths 
from unintentional overdose at 1256, a 57  % increase 
from 2012, with the overdose rate exceeding the national 
rate in 2013 and 2014 [5]. Declaring opioid overdose 
a public health emergency, the state has called for an 
urgent public health response and a broad and multi-
pronged approach to addressing the rising and record 
high number of opioid overdose fatalities in the state [6]. 
It has become clear that new and innovative strategies are 
needed.
Access to and use of naloxone–commonly referred 
to by its brand name, Narcan™–is an important tool in 
opioid overdose prevention. Naloxone, an opioid antago-
nist, can immediately reverse an overdose upon admin-
istration. Distribution of Naloxone has been found to 
be a safe, feasible, and effective intervention in commu-
nity settings, primarily in harm reduction and substance 
abuse treatment programs [7]. Laypersons, following a 
brief training, can safely administer intranasal naloxone 
to reverse overdose [8, 9]. Access to naloxone for com-
munity members has been further promoted, in Massa-
chusetts and many other states, by the establishment of 
“standing orders” which are used in various situations to 
permit dispensing of naloxone rescue kits to laypeople 
without direct interaction with the prescriber [10, 11]. 
A pharmacy standing order is an agreement between a 
pharmacy and prescriber that permits the pharmacy to 
dispense naloxone rescue kits to people without a pre-
scription or a direct relationship between the prescriber 
and pharmacy customer based on criteria agreed upon 
by the prescriber and pharmacy [12]. A hospital stand-
ing order is similarly an agreement between an inpatient 
pharmacy and a prescriber to dispense a naloxone rescue 
kit to patients upon discharge who meet pre-specified 
criteria, but do not have a direct relationship with the sig-
natory of the standing order.
The demonstrated efficacy of order sets, pre-specified 
lists of treatment orders for a specific diagnosis, [13] pro-
vides insight into the potential value of standing orders 
for naloxone kit provision. Effective integration of order 
sets in hospital settings has been shown to improve clini-
cal processes and patient outcomes for a range of medi-
cal conditions, [14, 15] though little is known about the 
utility of standardized processes for dispensing naloxone 
in these settings. Literature on order sets emphasizes the 
importance of provider determinants of successful inte-
gration including clinician satisfaction and perceived 
value [16]. A recent survey found that, despite barriers, 
emergency medicine physicians were willing to per-
form opioid harm reduction interventions [17]. Given 
the essential role of other clinical staff in care provision, 
successful integration efforts must take into account 
pharmacist, nurse, and other clinician’s perceptions of 
naloxone distribution via standing order.
High and increasing levels of opioid overdose present 
to emergency departments (EDs): in the US in 2011, 
there were 420,040 ED visits related to narcotic pain 
medications, an increase of 153  % from 2004. In addi-
tion, 258,482 ED visits were related to heroin, up from 
187,493 in 2005 [18, 19]. The ED, often the initial point of 
contact for care for opioid-related issues, is a potentially 
high-yield location for delivery of overdose prevention 
activities.
As one potential measure to save lives from opioid 
overdose, one Boston safety net hospital introduced an 
innovative policy for nasal naloxone distribution. The 
ED partnered with local and state public health agen-
cies to ensure that every patient seen at the ED with or 
at risk for opioid overdose was offered overdose educa-
tion, training on the use of nasal naloxone and take home 
naloxone. Offering overdose prevention education and 
naloxone rescue kits to people likely to be present at an 
overdose is consistent with APHA, CDC, SAMHSA and 
Office of National Drug Control Policy recommendations 
[20, 21]. In this study, we used the Promoting Action on 
Research Implementation in Health Services (PARiHS) 




We had two aims in this study: (1) understand the accept-
ance and uptake of the policy; and (2) identify facilita-
tors and barriers of success. To address these aims, we 
obtained data on nasal naloxone distribution in the ED 
before and during the initial year of policy implementa-
tion, and then conducted a qualitative study to identify 
the facilitators and barriers to uptake. At the time of 
implementing the new initiative, the ED treated approxi-
mately 30 patients for overdose per month, in addition 
to a large number of patients with opioid use disorder 
diagnoses. A new policy to address overdose policy was 
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promulgated in September 2013, with implementation 
beginning in January 2014.
Prior to the new policy, the model of care for over-
dose education and naloxone distribution was refer-
ral of opioid-using patients to a dedicated ED program 
that used Health Promotion Advocates (HPAs) available 
from 9 a.m. to 11 p.m. daily whose primary responsibil-
ity was referral to detoxification or substance abuse treat-
ment, which has been previously described [22]. In the 
8 months prior to policy implementation (January –Sep-
tember 2013) approximately 8  % of ED patients consid-
ered at risk for overdose (based on ICD-9 ED discharge 
codes associated with opioid overdose or opioid misuse/
dependence; see Additional file 1 for a list of codes used 
to establish the denominator) received naloxone rescue 
kits in the ED. The low distribution rate was attributed to 
staffing patterns, patient factors, procedural issues, and 
lack of knowledge and/or support for the intervention. 
Institution of the new policy meant that naloxone kits 
could be distributed upon discharge from the ED during 
times when the HPAs were not on duty (11 p.m.–9 a.m.) 
and when outpatient pharmacies were closed. Naloxone 
kits were therefore available 24 h per day via one of three 
methods: (1) the HPA program; (2) outpatient pharmacy 
prescriptions written in the ED; or (3) inpatient phar-
macy distribution by ED staff via the hospital standing 
order during times when the HPAs were not available or 
the outpatient pharmacy was closed.
At the time of policy development, overdose risk was 
broadly defined, and although there were guidelines in 
the policy (see Additional file 2 for a copy of the policy), 
interpretation was left to the ED provider’s discretion. 
The goal of the new policy was broader distribution of 
naloxone. Yet, data from the initial 8 months post-initi-
ation of the policy (October 2013–May 2014) showed no 
expansion, with 7  % of emergency department patients 
with the same overdose risks based on the ICD-9 codes 
described above receiving take home naloxone in the 
ED. Thus, it was important to understand the barriers to 
policy adoption and what might facilitate better uptake of 
the policy x.
Study design and conceptual framework
We conducted formative evaluation to understand barri-
ers and facilitators to policy adoption. We used qualita-
tive methods to assess the perspectives of a wide range 
of participants involved in the provision of ED care. To 
design our data collection instrument, we used the origi-
nal Promoting Action on Research Implementation in 
Health Services (PARiHS) framework [23] which views 
implementation success as a function of relationships 
among three broad interrelated elements: evidence, con-
text, and facilitation. According to PARiHS, the nature 
and communication of evidence, qualities of context, 
and appropriateness/technical aptitude of facilitation all 
determine how implementation outcomes are achieved. 
Most successful implementation occurs when there is a 
high level of each of the three elements. The construct 
of evidence goes beyond research evidence to include 
clinical experience, patient experience and local data or 
information. Context includes culture, leadership and 
evaluation. Facilitation relates to the process of enabling 
the implementation and includes the role played by the 
leader, as well as the skills and attributes possessed by 
that leader.
The semi-structured interview guide addressed issues 
related to the elements of evidence, context and facili-
tation. We focused on building our understanding of 
what individual interview and focus group participants 
believed about naloxone and its utility for overdose 
prevention, and beliefs about drug use and overdose. 
Further, we explored contextual factors of the ED that 
impacted policy implementation, including staff roles 
and responsibilities, logistical challenges, patient chal-
lenges, and the processes by which the facilitation of the 
policy occurred. Some specific areas (see Additional file 3 
for guide) targeted during the interviews included knowl-
edge of the policy, feelings about feasibility, target popu-
lations, provider roles and responsibilities, experience 
with naloxone, knowledge and use of the HPA program, 
and training.
Data collection procedures
The ED employs a broad range of staff; our goal was to 
obtain a sample that included the perspectives of that 
range of staff members. Due to scheduling and roles, 
we conducted both focus groups (if at least three indi-
viduals in the same target population could attend) or 
individual interviews where more appropriate, i.e., phy-
sician administrators, nurse managers. In total, we con-
ducted seven focus groups and six individual qualitative 
interviews using the same interview guide. Interviews 
and focus groups were conducted with ED leadership, 
attending and resident MDs, nurse management, nurse 
educators, staff nurses, HPAs and pharmacists. Data 
collection was conducted in private conference spaces 
between June and August 2014. Individual interviews 
lasted between 24 and 36 min with a mean and median of 
30 min; focus groups lasted between 24 and 43 min with 
a mean of 31 min and a median of 30 min. All interviews 
and focus groups were conducted by two members of the 
study team and were audio-taped. Each participant also 
completed a brief anonymous demographic information 
form. Verbal informed consent was obtained from all 
study participants, as approved by the Boston University 
Medical Center IRB.
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Data analysis
After each interview was completed, the audio-tape 
was sent to a professional transcription company, and 
transcribed verbatim for analysis. Following receipt of 
the transcribed interview, the researchers reviewed the 
transcripts for accuracy of transcription. To conduct the 
analysis, we used standard qualitative research methods 
using the basic procedures of grounded theory meth-
odology and the constant comparative method [24, 25]. 
Using this methodology, the same two team members 
trained in qualitative research methods inductively ana-
lyzed the transcripts, generating theory from the data. 
The text was initially reviewed line-by-line and coded 
to characterize comments and passages. The transcripts 
were then re-evaluated to group codes into conceptual 
categories. Following coding of the initial set of tran-
scripts, the entire research team met to discuss the find-
ings and developed an initial coding scheme. The team 
then independently coded the next two transcripts, 
incorporated the new data into the initial conceptual 
categories, refined the existing categories to allow for a 
better ‘‘fit’’ of the new data, and added new categories 
as needed. After consensus for the refined themes was 
established, this process was continued with the same 
two members of the research team coding each of the 
remaining transcripts, followed by meetings to discuss 
coding discrepancies and make final coding decisions. 
The authors then completed final analyses, identifying 
overall themes and conceptual categories, and selecting 
the most reflective quotations. Following identification 
of the themes, as our final analytic step, we mapped the 
themes that emerged from the inductive coding process 
back to the core constructs of the PARiHS framework 
(evidence, context, facilitation) examining the strength 
or weakness of each to provide us with an understanding 
of the successes and challenges of the implementation. 
(See Rycroft-Malone, 2004 [23], Table  1 for a detailed 
description of the elements of the PARiHS framework 
and the distinction between high versus low levels of 
each sub-element).
Results
Description of the study sample
The final sample of 50 participants included 19 physi-
cians, 26 registered nurses, 3 HPAs, and 2 pharmacists. 
Table  1 describes basic demographic and practice char-
acteristics of the study participants. The participants 
were predominately female, with half over age 45. More 
than half had worked in this ED at least 6 years. With the 
exception of the resident physicians, who by the nature of 
their role had worked in the ED for 4 years or less, length 
of service among the nurses and attending physicians 
ranged from 4 to 25 years.
Overview of qualitative themes
We used the focus group and interview data to provide us 
with an in-depth understanding of the participants’ views 
of the policy implementation. Emerging from our analy-
sis was a series of themes related to barriers and facili-
tators, as well as multiple suggestions for improvement 
that were grouped into thematic categories. Primary 
themes related to facilitators included: (A) the interven-
tion being real-world driven with philosophical, clinician 
and leadership support; (B) the implementation of some 
early basic education and training efforts; (C) availability 
of resources (e.g., 24 h availability of staff); and (D) abil-
ity for patients to actually leave the ED with the nalox-
one kit in hand. Yet, relevant to the lack of uptake of the 
intervention, the barriers were multiple and fell into the 
following five more general categories: (A) protocol and 
policy-related barriers; (B) workflow and logistical bar-
riers; (C) patient-related barriers; (D) barriers related 
to staff roles and responsibilities; and (E) education and 
training barriers.
Facilitators
Philosophical stance of support for naloxone distribution
There was a strong sense of support for the interven-
tion for a multitude of reasons. It was considered to be 
real-world driven and consistent with both the mission 
of the hospital as a major safety net provider, as well as 
the current community and political climates. As a safety 
net hospital, ED staff embraced distribution of naloxone 
kits as a practical tool closely aligned with the overall 
public health mission of prevention. Kit distribution was 
viewed as in sync with statewide and national awareness 
of addiction as a disease, the severity of the opioid over-
dose crisis, and the need for a multi-pronged approach to 
Table 1 Characteristics of study participants (n = 50)
Characteristic N %
Sex
 Male 22 44
 Female 28 56
Age
 <25 17 34
 36–45 8 16
 46–55 11 22
 56–65 14 28
Years of work in this ED
 1 or less 8 16
 2–5 16 32
 6–10 8 16
 11–20 9 18
 >20 9 18
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address the crisis. A member of the ED leadership team 
said the following:
I don’t think you’re going to find much philosophical 
resistance here… You know, I think for this depart-
ment, the public health mission is who we are. So 
I think that there’s an overall attitude of it is great 
and exciting to take care of illnesses and shootings 
and overdoses. But it’s just as exciting to prevent the 
next one. So I think that clearly this is a receptive 
environment, I think on the whole. (Interview 3).
A second component of the philosophical support was 
that naloxone was clearly viewed as an evidence-based 
intervention in terms of its effectiveness. The philosophi-
cal stance of support was apparent at all levels, from hos-
pital leadership and ED administration to the range of 
clinical and support staff. An illustrative quotation from 
a focus group described the general tenor of ED staff: 
Why would you be against Narcan? I can’t even think of 
a rational argument….It’s like it’s something like condoms 
or…that’s like being against water… (Focus Group 7).
Education and training foundational efforts
Despite the low uptake, some groundwork to support the 
implementation of the policy was initiated. Participants 
believed that, for the most part, there was general famili-
arity with policy. Personnel were notified via email and 
electronic communication of the policy by the physician 
champion of the policy within the ED, and were also pro-
vided with some basic one-on-one information. Commu-
nication techniques were tailored to the fast pace of the ED 
and included “catching” people when possible when they 
were working, although this was not done systematically. 
Resident physicians were familiar with the HPA model, but 
less aware of the specifics of how to prescribe naloxone 
rescue kits themselves or order them through the inpatient 
pharmacy. In addition to basic information given by the 
physician leading the effort, nurse educators, who have the 
primary responsibility for the conduct of training, made 
efforts to inform ED staff about the policy and spread the 
policy in multiple ways. They utilized electronic commu-
nication, conducted in-services, had pharmacy staff train 
staff nurses in use of the naloxone kit, put up posters, and 
obtained permission from the local department of public 
health to upload their videos to the nursing webpage.
Availability of resources
Certain resources were available in the ED to support 
naloxone kit distribution, ensuring this initiative was 
taken more seriously than other unfunded mandates. 
Specifically, the HPAs were trained and provided nalox-
one rescue kits via the state prevention pilot program. 
Physicians and nurses pointed to the crucial role of the 
HPA, including both having the time to distribute the 
naloxone kits, and critically, having the time and exper-
tise to deliver the education components. Further, par-
ticipants acknowledged two new resources becoming 
available at the time of policy implementation that sup-
port the effort and potentially improve uptake: a 24-h 
pharmacy within the ED and 24-h availability of social 
workers on a daily basis.
Ability to leave the ED with a naloxone kit
Along with the option to prescribe naloxone for patients to 
pick up at an outpatient pharmacy, this ED has naloxone 
available on-site to distribute to patients, allowing them the 
option to leave the hospital with the kit in hand. The HPA 
program naloxone kits are provided by the state’s public 
health agency and workers can hand these to patients (and 
interested family members or supportive others) at no cost. 
This option allows for simple and streamlined access to the 
actual kit and avoids the extra step, and potential stigma, of 
going to the pharmacy to pick up the kit with the prescrip-
tion. Kits can also be distributed by the ED pharmacy dur-
ing hours when the HPAs are unavailable. The policy was 
intended to allow for easy distribution by a range of pro-
viders via the hospital standing order and the ability for any 
member of the ED staff to theoretically obtain the naloxone 
kit and provide it to a patient. One provider described the 
importance of easy access:
If it’s not in their hand walking out the door, if they 
need it, they got too many other things on their plate 
to go worry about as opposed to go get it. And if they 
don’t need it, then it’s not a big problem. So unless 
you can hand it to people, I would bet that the follow 
through is low (Interview 2).
In addition, another facilitator was that the policy 
allowed for the immediate distribution of the kit to fam-
ily members and caregivers who come to the ED with a 
patient, which one participant describe as potentially 
very welcome by and accessible to family members, as 
well as more accessible to individuals as risk for overdose:
I think in an ideal world, somebody would walk out 
with it…I mean, in some ways it’s a little counterin-
tuitive because people are more than happy to wait 
in a line at CVS for their Percocet prescription. But 
if they happen to get that—but they’re very less likely 
to—when they’re kind of in the midst of this kind of 
overdose haze to walk in. The family might do that, 
you know? A mother, brother, sister, father might do 
that. But I think a lot of other–you know, the person 
who’s abusing substances themselves or their imme-
diate surrounding kind of peer group, I’m not sure. 
(Interview 1).
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Barriers
Protocol and policy related barriers
There were multiple protocol and policy related barri-
ers. First, the policy was felt to have been developed with 
insufficient input from frontline staff. The people work-
ing in the ED who do the actual work and implement 
the policy were not involved in its development. As one 
physician stated, …the people who designed the policy…
don’t work nightshifts… (Interview 6) and thus would not 
understand the unique challenges of implementation. 
This was coupled with an under-developed implementa-
tion plan to accompany the policy. Additionally, the phy-
sician who signed the hospital standing order was not an 
ED provider and there was strong consensus that many 
individuals simply did not know who this person was; the 
lack of familiarity led to hesitancy to use the order.
Second, there is a major challenge in identifying who is 
the “right” patient to be offered/to receive the naloxone 
kit. While the policy includes patients who have over-
dosed and many categories of patients felt to be at risk for 
overdose, there is confusion and lack of consensus over 
who the appropriate kit recipient is. Multiple participants 
described these challenges:
I think it’s hard. I think that the person who over-
doses is by far the–you can’t miss that person, it’s a 
red sign. But the patient who you go through their 
history and they say, “Yes, I use IV drugs, I use IV 
heroin,” but they’re not there for the heroin issue, but 
they’re there for maybe something unrelated to it, 
like chest pain or acid reflux or whatever else brings 
them in, a sprained elbow, that sometimes you can 
think about, “Oh, their primary problem is the 
elbow issue. It’s not that they’re all using IV heroin, 
I should address that today.” Because that’s not what 
they came for and that’s not necessarily what I jump 
to as the primary reason why they came, either… 
The older folks on chronic narcotics fill up half the 
ER most of the time anyway and I think that that 
population is just not—at least it’s not in my mind 
as much…And I think also the people who come in 
on 20 different meds, et cetera… (Focus Group 1).
The absence of any clear, objective criteria led to lack 
of consensus. There appeared to be some areas of general 
agreement. For example, one participant stated offering 
the kit …if I see in their prior visits that they’ve been to the 
ED for heroin overdose five times already. (Focus Group 
5) Another person, who indicated rarely offering the kit, 
stated:
I just don’t think about it a lot, or a few times I’ve 
run into people saying they didn’t want it and I 
never went beyond that. However, the ones that I do 
think about and offer it to, it depends on what they 
came into the emergency department for. And usu-
ally if it’s anything related to IV drug use, whether 
it’s an overdose or an abscess from IV drug use, is 
when I think about it. (Focus Group 3).
A third participant stated I have given it to people 
who’ve come in for opiate-related complaints as well. Or if 
I have seen that they’ve been here a lot for opiates, but not 
necessarily with this visit. (Focus Group 3).
However, despite some clear specific consensus tar-
gets for naloxone rescue kits (people who have over-
dosed, people who use injection drugs with multiple 
visits), overall there was not consensus on who warranted 
receiving a rescue kit and who did not. While some hos-
pital leaders believed that anyone prescribed an opioid 
should be offered naloxone, many providers strongly 
believed that this was not feasible, realistic or appropri-
ate. As one individual stated,
Well, in a resourced world where you have somebody 
who could really do effective navigation… that was 
the discordance when I really looked at the policy… 
that just getting to an at risk population versus those 
who have evident and immediate risk of death, 
I think you got to– in a world of limited resources, 
you have to decide where you’re going to devote your 
time and effort. (Interview 6).
At the same time, there was concern that the policy was 
developed without thinking through where it was most 
applicable: for example, while interviewees believed that 
probably one of the most receptive groups are the parents 
of the younger people, the perception was that there was 
no involvement with or participation of the pediatric ED.
A fourth policy-related barrier was the uncertainty 
about what the ED parameters for naloxone kit distribu-
tion are. Despite the strong sense that this ED has a pub-
lic health, preventive mission, there was a feeling that it 
is important to clearly define the appropriate role of the 
ED in these types of public health functions, wondering 
about the role of the ED to educate or just address imme-
diate life-threatening issues. Some participants desired 
naloxone kit distribution to be similarly to the simplicity 
of routine distribution of condoms. Others likened it to 
providing a prescription for an epi pen following an aller-
gic reaction. These ideas were raised multiple times and 
encapsulated in a focus group:
In urgent care, there is a…a basket of condoms, 
which is a public health concern and lots of things 
and people literally on their way out the door grab a 
handful….every once in a while a kid walks by and 
thinks it’s candy and his parents have to kind of take 
their hand away, which may bring some awkward 
conversations to the ride home. And I understand 
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Narcan is different, it’s a drug there are different 
rules and all that sort of stuff. Can’t buy Narcan at 
the pharmacy, but you can buy condoms at a phar-
macy, I get all that. But the concept is exactly the 
same. (Focus Group 7).
Another provider said the following:
If I were to model it on treatment of allergic reac-
tions, we identify people routinely when they have 
a screening drug history that they have anaphy-
laxis to penicillin. Theoretically, they should have 
a med alert bracelet, they should carry an epi pen, 
we should write a prescription for them because they 
are at risk of having–or they have a peanut allergy. 
Is that really the role of the emergency department? 
(Interview 6).
Work‑flow and logistical barriers
Workflow and logistical barriers were myriad and many 
were attributed to poorly thought-through implemen-
tation issues in the development of the policy. First, 
the concept of a standing verbal order was a foreign 
and utterly unfamiliar work flow process, particularly 
among the nursing staff, who stated this was the only 
policy structured this way and was totally inconsist-
ent with current practice. As explained by nurses in one 
focus group, there is no mechanism for standing verbal 
orders …because we’re told we’re not allowed to take ver-
bal orders… and We’re only allowed to take verbal orders 
in life-and death emergencies…. (Focus Group 3); Second, 
while the hospital standing order theoretically meant that 
no written order or prescription was required to obtain 
the naloxone kit from the ED pharmacy, in practice, 
paper documentation was required by the pharmacy to 
dispense the medication, while all other documentation 
to dispense medications was done electronically.
Another logistical and workflow issue related to the 
electronic medical record (EMR). At the time of policy 
implementation, the institution was introducing a new 
electronic medical record system. Staff needed to become 
familiar with the new system and the system initially did 
not include naloxone either as an option for ordering for 
a discharge, making staff unable to easily order it. Moreo-
ver, asking about overdose history/risk was not included 
as a part of the standard set of questions in the standard 
workflow/templates within the EMR.
Beyond the EMR, there were multiple barriers to phys-
ically accessing the naloxone kit and getting it to the 
patient. The HPAs hold and administer the free kits pro-
vided by the public health department. For non-HPA staff 
to provide kits to patients from the hospital pharmacy, 
the process for ordering was not simple or clear. Those 
who tried to access the actual kit indicated that obtaining 
it was extremely challenging and included multiple and 
unclear steps. Pharmacists indicated that they could be 
available to access the kit, deliver it and potentially even 
educate patients on its use. However, not being directly 
involved in patient care, there was not a clear and con-
sistent trigger to notify them that a patient needed a kit.
Another key barrier identified was lack of clarity/con-
sensus on the best time to distribute naloxone. Both 
physicians and nurses expressed that discharge may not 
be the optimal time to offer it, with a common sentiment 
being 
…I think the hard part is we wait for the end when 
they’re ready to go and half these patients, we all 
know, they’re on their way out, you know. They’re not 
going to wait for their discharge paperwork, never 
mind the…Narcan… (Focus Group 7).
The following exchange between two nurses in a focus 
group illustrates the logistical challenges that staff faced, 
even when very motivated to provide a kit:
Participant C: I gave one to a father one night who 
was here with his kid. And kind of at his wits’ end. 
There was no detox to get him into. Father was kind 
of “what am I supposed to do?” And the physicians 
and I talked about it, and we got one. With a lot of 
difficulty… Got it from the pharmacy. And I mean, 
I had to pull up the emails that this was going to be 
able to be available to give it to the pharmacist in 
order to get it. It was the only ….
Participant D: It was really difficult.
Participant C: It was very difficult. The father was 
very appreciative. It was the only one I’ve done.
Participant D: It’s like we got the emails and 
nobody in the pharmacy got the emails. We all knew 
it was available and they wouldn’t give it out. It was 
horrible, trying to get it. Way more work than it was 
worth. (Focus Group 3).
Staff perception of patient‑related barriers
Staff perception of patient related barriers to naloxone 
kit distribution were frequently raised beyond deciding 
who the right patient is to be offered the kit. There was 
a hesitation to vocalize what could be interpreted as a 
pejorative description of the profile of patients, particu-
larly those who are admitted with an overdose and other 
drug-related issues. It was stated by most staff that the 
patients can be very challenging. Despite the medical 
Page 8 of 14Drainoni et al. BMC Res Notes  (2016) 9:465 
understanding of addiction and the fact that patients are 
experiencing withdrawal from the naloxone—meaning 
their brain and body need opioids not to feel “dope sick”–
their impatience and behavior of wanting to leave the ED 
should be expected. And yet, comments included that the 
patients do not care that they overdosed; they tend to be 
an impulsive group that does not want to wait, they may 
be anxious and want to leave once the overdose has been 
reversed. The following interchange occurred between 
two participants:
Participant A: …it’s my own opinion…but from 
when I talk to people…say they’re a very difficult 
patient population to care for. They’re not the nic-
est people. A lot of times they are, as Participant B 
said earlier, anxious or they want to leave, they want 
to go smoke. They have all these other kind of coun-
ter habits that go along with it. And sometimes the 
nurses say they would approach them to do some of 
the teaching and the patient itself would say, “Oh, 
no, I’m not interested in that, get that away from me, 
I have an allergy to that.”
Participant B: Yeah…going along those lines, they, a 
lot of them have come back to life after an OD in the 
ER and they’re ready to go. They don’t want to even 
wait for the safe amount of time…Or they’ve had the 
experience of having it administered and they don’t 
want any part of anyone knowing about it. (Focus 
Group 5).
Another participant stated that some of the patients 
…did not want their ‘high’ to have been reversed by Nar-
can and so are not interested in getting some to go.(Focus 
Group 6).
Further, many patients who are substance involved have 
co-occurring life stressors and struggles including housing, 
vocational and economic instability, and are often the tar-
get of societal discrimination and scorn. Given these chal-
lenges faced by many of the patients, there was a feeling 
that the option of providing a prescription rather than an 
actual kit was a barrier in that patients are unlikely to fill 
it due to inconvenience, stigma, and possibility of incur-
ring an insurance a co-payment. In addition, patients who 
have overdosed tend to be alone in the ED. Many staff 
interviewed note that the target recipient of kits should be 
family and friends of the patients rather than the patients 
themselves and suggested it was perhaps more important 
to think about alternative mechanisms beyond the ED visit 
to reach out to these partners and family: …It’s reaching 
their partners. I think it’s reaching their family…..because 
the patient isn’t interested. (Focus Group 6).
Finally, despite general support for naloxone kit dis-
tribution in the ED, a vocal minority of ED staff across 
disciplines raised important questions regarding what 
they see as a potentially unspoken, but important barrier 
to kit distribution. This relates to their perception of who 
is “worthy” to receive naloxone. Some wanted patients 
to demonstrate motivation in order to be offered the kit. 
They expected that a patient “pull oneself up by the boot-
straps” rather than be enabled:
But for me, the patient has to show some motivation. 
I mean, I’ll offer it. If they’re interested, they’re going 
to get one. If they really blow me off, I’m not going to 
stick one in their backpack. They need to show some 
motivation if they want it. I do have to be given that. 
(Focus Group 3).
One provider talked about some of the challenges staff 
face: I think the reality is you can change people’s behav-
ior in certain ways, you can’t always change their beliefs. 
(Interview 2). Another person gave the opinion that all of 
the staff likely had feelings about who is worthy that are 
tied up in beliefs and feelings about whether addiction is 
self-inflicted or a disease:
I think that partly people are part of the culture 
that they’ve grown up in and people that use drugs, 
unless it’s somebody you know or a family member, 
it becomes very stigmatizing. I think sometimes the 
patients can be very, very challenging to deal with 
and so that also sort of weighs into it, I think. That 
people still don’t understand. You came in with 
endocarditis once before and almost died, and you’re 
still shooting and you’re back here again with the 
same problem. What’s up with that? Yeah, I think 
there’s still a sense of– there’s the deserving and the 
undeserving ill and this is self-inflicted and not dis-
ease. I don’t think people in healthcare are immune 
to that…. I think people who work in healthcare, A, 
come from different perspectives, but also they’re 
human beings last time I checked. So, we have our 
own biases. We grew up in a culture where some 
behaviors are acceptable and not. (Interview 6).
Staff roles and responsibilities
It was almost unanimous that no one knew what staff 
member or members were responsible for naloxone 
kit distribution, other than the HPAs when they were 
available. While the concept behind the hospital stand-
ing order is that every staff member, at all levels, could 
provide a kit when appropriate, that was not considered 
realistic. Repeatedly stated were comments related to kit 
distribution not being in anyone’s job description or not 
being anyone’s responsibility.
When asked specifically whose job they believed it was, 
there was little agreement, either by discipline or by level. 
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There was strong belief among staff with clinical respon-
sibilities that they are too busy and have too many com-
peting demands, and they have conflicting ideas about 
who can/should do it: I have no doubt if you ask nurses 
who should do it, it’ll be physicians. And if you ask physi-
cians who will do it, it will be nurses….(Focus Group 7). 
Physicians said that their understanding was that nurses 
would be doing this after hours when the HPAs were 
unavailable: …it makes sense to me in that the nurses are 
the end point of discharge, particularly off hours, where 
it’s part of their role and responsibility, I think, to make 
sure the patients have a discharge plan…. (Interview 6).
On the other hand, nurses strongly believed that dis-
pensing medication is not part of their nursing role, 
inconsistent with current practice, and raises questions 
about legality and the impact on their nursing licenses. 
One nurse said No other medication is the nurses’ respon-
sibility to give without an order from a physician, while 
another said, No. No, we would not routinely take orders 
that aren’t directly written by the on-duty physician. 
(Focus Group 3).
At the same time, while acknowledging the high level 
of clinical responsibilities of residents, some attending 
physicians believed this was the residents’ responsibil-
ity, stating there are always residents. (Interview 6) How-
ever, those in charge of the residency believed strongly 
that this was not an appropriate role for the residents. 
Though many participants believed that kit distribution 
and patient education could be a pharmacy or social 
work role, the pharmacists suggested it should be the role 
of a person with clinical responsibility, and specifically 
residents. The HPAs believe it is only a small part of their 
job, despite other staff perceptions to the contrary. Over-
all, while the concept of kit distribution being a respon-
sibility of all staff was, in many ways, considered a good 
model, there were diverse opinions about this and it was 
acknowledged that it could be challenging. One resident 
aptly described the challenges of this being a somewhat 
universal function in the ED environment:
I think that gets at a bigger issue we face as a busy 
emergency department with a lot of people having 
times when they have to step out of what they typi-
cally– or what you think your defined role might be, 
to actually make stuff happen. So I think that on the 
one hand, it could make it be that everybody says it’s 
not my job. And there’s certainly frustration around 
a lot of things where that happens. But at the same 
time, at times if there’s only one person who’s respon-
sible for doing it, they have a lot of other responsi-
bilities, too, and it’ll make things slow down or not 
happen…So I think there’s probably not a perfect 
answer, but for most everything else in our depart-
ment, it falls under everybody sort of has to do eve-
rything depending on the circumstances. And I think 
this would just sort of go along with that as our prac-
tice and culture here. (Focus Group 1).
It was also noted that the mechanism and responsibility 
for kit distribution vary depending on the shift and ED 
staff work rotating shifts. This was viewed as confusing 
to many participants. For example HPAs are not avail-
able during the overnight hours (3rd shift). Yet, due to 
reliance on the HPAs on other shifts, staff working on 
the 3rd shift may not actually know the steps to take that 
result in a patient being discharged from the ED with a 
kit in hand. Another example involves the differing role 
of pharmacy by shift and the hours of operation of the 
various hospital based pharmacies. Due to regulatory 
issues, the hospital based pharmacy can only directly dis-
pense the medication in the ED during off hours when 
the outpatient pharmacy is closed. As a result, each time 
of day there is a different process.
Education and training gaps
The final barrier identified was a set of training and edu-
cation gaps for staff and patients. Staff members need 
two types of training: training in the policy and its imple-
mentation; and training on how to use the naloxone kits. 
Staff consistently spoke about not knowing how to use 
the kits themselves and thus, how to best teach patients 
how to use the kits. Many indicated that their only expe-
rience addressing substance use needs beyond diagnosis 
was referring to the HPA program.
Staff also uniformly felt that patients and families need 
training about what naloxone is, how it works, and how 
to use the kits. There was a strong belief that the kit is not 
simple to use and educating patients is a big time com-
mitment. Thus they believed it was important to deter-
mine how to incorporate patient training into the work 
flow, as time pressures and other responsibilities make it 
difficult for staff to do actual patient training.
Discussion
Results from the focus groups and interviews revealed 
participants’ insights about the influences and con-
sequences of the new policy. The results help to illus-
trate how the actual implementation of a new policy 
or health care delivery intervention is largely driven by 
factors beyond acceptance of the policy or interven-
tion. Despite strong philosophical support at all levels 
and devotion of select resources, the implementation 
of the new naloxone distribution policy in action was 
challenging, with low uptake. Examining this using the 
PARiHS framework constructs of evidence, context and 
facilitation provides important insight into the results 
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and perceptions, and supports improvements in policy 
implementation.
Evidence
In the PARiHS framework the construct of evidence 
includes research evidence, clinical experience, patient 
experience and local data or information [23, 26]. In 
terms of research evidence, responses were unequivocal 
regarding naloxone itself; no one questioned its safety 
and efficacy. Notably, the ED staff did not identify some 
of the other concerns raised in the literature regarding 
the safety and effectiveness of nasal naloxone in terms 
of risks, such as: side effects of home administration; not 
seeking care; or increasing the risks of using more opi-
oids to overcome the effects of naloxone [27–29]. In addi-
tion, while physician participants did not raise concern 
about the medicolegal risks to prescribers found in other 
studies [30], this was a primary concern among nursing 
staff in our study, who do not have authority to prescribe 
medications.
On the other hand, the research evidence about the 
effectiveness of providing naloxone kits as prevention in 
the ED setting was viewed as lacking. Specifically noted 
was the absence of any clear, objective criteria or clinical 
guidelines defining what it means to be at risk for over-
dose leading to lack of consensus for identifying who to 
offer the kit to. Because ED-based naloxone kit deliv-
ery is not a standard, evidence-based practice, it will be 
important to concretely identify–based on evidence that 
does exist from other settings–who is at risk for overdose 
death to assist the ED in identifying a clear population 
target [9, 30, 31].
Clinical and patient experience, key components of 
evidence according to PARiHS, created substantial bar-
riers to implementation. ED patients presenting with 
an overdose or other drug-related issues were viewed as 
extremely challenging, impulsive and potentially unwill-
ing to accept or wait for the kit to be delivered to them. 
Clinical experience showed providers that, given the 
challenges faced by many of the patients, simply provid-
ing a prescription was insufficient. Moreover, clinical 
experience led the group to consider that a better model 
of delivery would be to offer the naloxone to family and/
or friends of the patients rather than the patients them-
selves; however, many patients are alone in the ED.
Patient experience was a barrier, according to staff. 
Withdrawal symptoms after overdoses had been reversed 
by naloxone made patients unlikely to want to experience 
naloxone again. Although naloxone rescue is lifesaving, it 
is not immediately appreciated by the overdose survivor, 
who is often experiencing very uncomfortable withdrawal 
symptoms. The ED has little to offer an overdose patient 
who has just been administered naloxone and is now in 
opioid withdrawal other than observation to ensure that 
the overdose does not recur. When detox programs are 
available, patients typically wait several hours with pro-
gressively worsening withdrawal symptoms. Immedi-
ate access to opioid agonist treatment, for which there is 
strong evidence [32], is not routinely accessible through 
the ED. Opioid addiction conditions people to do all that 
they can to avoid withdrawal. When they experience 
withdrawal, their focus is on relieving their symptoms 
by using opioids. It follows that a patient in withdrawal 
after an overdose is not in the best state to receive over-
dose prevention education and training to administer 
naloxone. Although patients with emergencies are often 
accompanied by caregivers, culture and processes to offer 
emergency response training and prevention education 
to caregivers within EDs are not well developed. Thus, 
focusing on caregiver training for the overdose survivor 
is likely a strategy that may be good for the patient and 
that ED staff are open to with the right level of training 
and resources.
Finally, there was the sense that local opinion or data 
were not reflected in policy development, specifically: 
who should actually be responsible for implementation/
who had the time to offer naloxone; optimal location for 
implementation; how to physically access the kits; and 
documentation processes. These details are especially 
important, as studies have shown that implementation 
of new interventions in hospital settings is extremely 
challenging and fraught with barriers, even if the new 
interventions are widely accepted evidence-based prac-
tices [33, 34]. Thus, the implementation of a practice not 
known to be evidence-based to a particularly challeng-
ing patient population is likely to be logarithmically more 
difficult.
Context
Several contextual factors related to PARiHS sub-ele-
ments: culture, leadership, and evaluation [23] were high. 
The institutional culture was a key factor in the concept 
of the policy being strongly embraced. The interven-
tion was considered to be real-world driven and consist-
ent with the mission of the hospital as a major safety net 
provider and one potential response to the current local 
and national opioid overdose death crisis. At the same 
time, the supportive sentiment was tempered by the 
desire to determine if this stance was an appropriate one 
for the ED. Part of culture is provision and allocation of 
resources; resources were provided to support imple-
mentation, although there was not widespread or full 
awareness of how to utilize those resources. Although 
naloxone kits were available, often free of charge, there 
were numerous workflow and logistical barriers faced by 
the staff that had to implement the policy or obtain the 
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kits that impeded implementation. Having a paper order 
in an electronic system is one such example.
Our findings are consistent with the literature on pre-
scriber motivation and interest in naloxone rescue kit 
distribution which identifies reticence around role clar-
ity and appropriate patient selection [29, 35]. This is best 
illustrated by the nursing staff’s indication that the stand-
ing verbal order was inconsistent with current practice, 
their concern about their medicolegal risks in ordering 
medications, and the near-universal confusion across 
all staff groups regarding whose job this was. The need 
for an extremely high degree of role clarity is particu-
larly important for a task that involves a different process 
utilizing unequally available resources on each of the 3 
shifts, particularly when staff may rotate among the dif-
ferent shifts. Role clarity has been found to be critical 
to job performance [36–38]; if roles for individuals are 
clarified, implementation may be improved, as studies 
have shown that EDs can effectively deliver public health-
related safety interventions and messages [39, 40].
Facilitation
Facilitation includes the role played by the leader, as well 
as the skills and attributes possessed by that leader [23] in 
enabling the implementation. In this intervention, facili-
tation was internal and was not led by a clearly identified 
clinician champion, although the ED-based leader of the 
initiative served as a de facto champion. There were not 
sufficient resources or time to support systematic ongo-
ing training in a structured manner. Thus, training was 
episodic and inconsistent, with the primary method of 
communication and training being via email, posters, or 
intermittently by clinicians who supported the policy, but 
were not the clearly identified owners. As a result, many 
staff indicated little to no awareness of the policy, while 
resident physicians who received some of their training 
from the clinician champion did indicate basic familiarity 
with it and recalled being taught about it in their train-
ing, although they were frequently unaware of the specif-
ics. This is consistent with the literature indicating that 
few physicians are even aware of ED-based naloxone pre-
scribing as an intervention to prevent overdose [27].
It is also important to widely engage staff. Studies have 
shown the importance of using mid-level managers, 
rather than just clinicians and leadership to implement 
innovations in health care [41] and this team did try to 
actively engage nurse managers and nurse educators, a 
positive step. Yet, that engagement was not ongoing, sys-
tematic, or consistent. In addition, a facilitation barrier 
was that—out of necessity-the policy was implemented 
quickly, without sufficient time for a thorough and con-
sistent implementation plan or consideration of other 
simultaneous and competing initiatives. For example, 
policy implementation occurred while the hospital was 
introducing a new EMR that did not include the option of 
naloxone kits as a discharge order. Additionally, another 
resource was provided relatively early in the implemen-
tation period via by increasing ED-based social work 
coverage to around the clock, with the social workers 
potentially available to train patients and distribute kits; 
however, this was hastily introduced to the rest of the ED 
staff without clarity regarding their role related to this 
process. Thus, rather than supporting the effort, it cre-
ated confusion.
Suggestions for improvement
Despite the challenges of implementation, people offered 
multiple suggestions to improve the implementation to 
ensure that naloxone is offered to individuals who could 
benefit. These included: (1) offering a clear definition of 
what it means to be at risk of overdose; (2) narrowing 
the target population in the initial stages of implemen-
tation to those at highest risk, such as those who have 
overdosed; (3) streamlining the process to mesh with the 
workflow, including the use of an EMR-based process 
that could include a template or an “opt out” option; (4) 
clear and specific identification of staff roles and assign-
ment of responsibilities; (5) identification of site cham-
pions; (6) instituting consistent training for all ED staff; 
(7) developing a training program for caregivers and 
families; (8) creating a method to ensure integration of 
patient and family training into the ED workflow; and 
(9) conduct regular audit and feedback to ED staff. Due, 
in part, to the preliminary results and the suggestions 
from participants, there have been some modifications. 
Modifications include integrating naloxone as a discharge 
medication into the EMR, increasing ED pharmacy avail-
ability to 24 h per day, and training house officers on use 
of naloxone as part of their basic life support training 
and on the policy. Early findings following introduction 
of these changes showed a modest increase in naloxone 
distribution in the ED, with internal data indicating 39 
naloxone kits distributed in October 2015.
Limitations
This study has some limitations. First, participants were 
recruited from a safety net institution in Massachu-
setts that had a high level of access to naloxone kits, and 
therefore, their views might not generalize to ED provid-
ers in other geographic locations. Second, although we 
conducted broad recruitment, participants self-selected 
to participate and those who agreed may have agreed 
because they had particularly strong views about the 
overdose epidemic, drug use and/or the intervention. In 
addition, as in any focus group study, although partici-
pants were assured of confidentiality and their responses 
Page 12 of 14Drainoni et al. BMC Res Notes  (2016) 9:465 
appeared to be very candid, including a range of negative 
comments and concerns about the program and sugges-
tions for improvement, we cannot exclude the possibil-
ity of biased or socially desirable responses. However, our 
goal was to examine the process of implementation of a 
policy, which may be highly generalizable and our find-
ings have important implications for clinical practice.
Conclusion
The problem of opioid overdose is at crisis levels and 
rising. Naloxone can reverse overdose and needs to be 
widely available. Multi-faceted, innovative solutions 
are needed to ensure that those who are most at risk for 
overdose have access. Thus, interventions such as the 
one proposed in this safety net ED are crucial. Yet, the 
uptake of this policy was limited. While the true potential 
of widespread access to naloxone rescue kits is unknown, 
understanding the experience of this safety net hospi-
tal is important to improve uptake in this setting and to 
offer possible solutions for other EDs. Use of the PAR-
iHS framework throughout the study design and analy-
sis, a strength of this study, allowed us to recognize key 
evidence, contextual and facilitation barriers to the suc-
cessful implementation of the policy to identify areas for 
intervention and improvement. In particular, we recom-
mend the identification of a limited and relatively focused 
target population with a high degree of risk to begin pol-
icy implementation. Use of diagnostic and-mechanism-
of-injury codes (International Classification of Diseases, 
Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification [ICD-9-CM] codes) 
is one potential strategy for defining and identifying 
patients most at risk for overdose [42]. We recommend 
the development of the capacity and training to engage 
caregivers of overdose survivors in overdose prevention 
and response during an ED visit. Once successful with 
these targeted groups there is potential to broaden the 
scope. In addition, it is important to recognize that staff 
perceive substantial patient-related barriers, whether 
or not these barriers exist in reality and to address those 
perceptions through staff education. The signatory of the 
hospital standing order should be someone who works in 
the ED and is a recognized clinical leader. Thus the sig-
natory can internally promote the standing order and be 
accountable to staff that have concerns. Furthermore, one 
clinical champion is unlikely to be sufficient. At least one 
clinical champion from each “role” in the ED should be 
identified and supported to promote the implementation 
of the overdose prevention policy within their respec-
tive roles and convey the opportunities and challenges to 
colleagues representing other roles. Finally, although the 
intent of the policy was that distribution of naloxone be a 
universal function, which was the reason for the standing 
order, it was apparent from interviews across all staff that 
this is not viable and that clarification of responsibility is 
vital. Clearly, the staff working are very invested in and 
supportive of finding methods to address opioid overdose, 
given its impact in this ED and nationwide, and would 
like to find methods to enhance the intervention; appro-
priately modifying the implementation process—paying 
attention to what was learned from this experience in 
terms of key components of evidence, context and facilita-
tion—is likely to lead to improvements and can serve as 
lessons for ED and other busy safety net environments.
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